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ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW
but such omissions as were made do not detract from either the
validity or the value of the statute. Further, they may be supplied
by amendment.
It is submitted that in order to perfect the statute, and better
effectuate its purpose, the following amendments should be made:
(1) Notary publics, commissioners of deeds and similar public
officers should be expressly excluded from the operation of the stat-
ute. As was pointed out above, the inclusion of this group is mere
supererogation; its exclusion may prevent a possible injustice.
(2) All those who retain outside employment and who derive,
therefrom, an income in excess of a stated amount should be included
within the statutory inhibition. The avowed purpose of the statute
is to alleviate unemployment and to improve the character of teaching
in the public schools. 44  The exclusion of those not employed as day
teachers would seem, to some extent, to defeat this purpose.
JULIUS R. PASCUZZO, JR.
THE LIABILITY OF PARKING LOT OWNERS.
I.
Recently the courts have been confronted with the sometime dif-
ficult problem of determining the exact nature of the legal relationship
existing between the owner of a parking lot and the owner of a car
parked therein.' The cases indicate that the problem has been ade-
quately solved by the courts' determination that the relationship is
either one in the nature of licensor and licensee 2 or that of bailor and
bailee 3 depending upon whether the owner of the car has merely hired
44 Hendon v. Board of Education, 281 N. Y. 757, 24 N. E. (2d) 20 (1940).
1 The problem was presented for the first time in any jurisdiction in Penn-
royal Fair Ass'n v. Hite, 195 Ky. 732, 243 S. W. 1046 (1922). The New York
courts were faced with the problem for the first time in Galowitz v. Magner,
208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept. 1924).2 Ex parte Mobile Light & R. R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924). See
Note (1924) 34 A. L. R. 925. "Cases which have refused to find a bailor-
bailee relationship between car owner and parking lot operator have not specified
the legal relationship existing between them. The two alternatives would be
that of lessor-lessee or that of licensor-licensee." (1924) 18 MINN. L. REv.
352, 353; see (1939) 9 FORTNIGHTLY L. J. 103.
3 Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept.
1924); Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fabian, 170 Misc. 665, 9 N. Y. S. (2d)
1018 (1938) ; Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, 109 Cal. App. 715, 293 Pac.
821 (1930) ; Crawford v. Hall, 56 Ga. App. 122, 192 S. E. 231 (1937) ; Keenan
Hotel Co. v. Funk, 93 Ind. App. 677, 177 N. E. 364 (1931); Downs v. Sley
System Garages, 129 Pa. 68, 194 Atl. 772 (1937) ; see Jones, The Parking Lot
Cases (1938) 27 GEo. L. J. 162; Notes (1934) 14 B. U. L. REv. 368; (1939)
37 MIcH. L. REv. 468; (1932) 30 MIcE. L. REv. 614.
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a place to put the vehicle, or whether he has turned its possession over
to the care and custody of the lot owner.
4
A review of the decisions of the courts of New York,5 as well
as those of other jurisdictions,6 discloses that in the majority of cases
the parking lot owner has been held to be a bailee and, therefore, lia-
ble for the theft of or the damage to a patron's car, occasioned by his
failure to exercise care in providing for its safety. Despite authority
to the contrary,7 however, the mere fact that the lot owner is engaged
in the business of storing automobiles 8 does not ipso facto impose
upon him the obligations of a bailee. This was aptly indicated in
Osborne v. Cline,9 wherein the court stated, "Any house or lot owner
may permit for a fee another to put his automobile upon the premises
without assuming any responsibility for its safety." 1o Whether the
parking lot owner in any given case is in the nature of a licensor, and
thus under no active duty to protect a patron's car,11 or a bailee under
the duty to use care, depends entirely upon the method employed by
him in conducting his business.'
2
An examination of the factual situations presented in the cases
involving suits against parking lot owners, discloses that parking lots
may be classified, according to the manner in which they transact
business, into two general classifications: 13 First, those in which the
4 In Osborne v. Cline, 263 N. Y. 434, 437, 189 N. E. 483, 484 (1934), the
court stated, "Whether a person simply hires a place to put his car or whether
he has turned its possession over to the care and custody of another depends on
the place, the conditions, and the nature of the transaction." See Galowitz v.
Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept. 1924).
5 Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fabian, 170 Misc. 665, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 1018(1938) ; cf. Lader v. Warsher, 165 Misc. 559, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 796 (1939) ; see
note 4, supra.
6 Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass. 341, 187 N. E. 620 (1933) ; White v. Ameri-
can Ins. Co., 53 Ga. App. 320, 185 S. E. 605 (1936) ; Scherb v. Randolph Wells
Auto Park, Inc., 30 Ill. App. 298, 22 N. E. (2d) 796 (1939) ; see cases note 3,
supra.
7 BERRY, LAW OF AuToMOBILES (4th ed. 1924) § 1414.
s It has been held that even garage keepers are not bailees as a matter of
law. Hogan v. O'Brien, 123 Misc. 865, 206 N. Y. Supp. 831 (1924).
9 263 N. Y. 434, 189 N. E. 483 (1934).
'0 Id. at 437, N. E. at 484.
12 Larmore v. Crown Point Iron Co., 101 N. Y. 391, 4 N. E. 752 (1886);
Morrison v. Hotel Rutledge Co., Inc., 200 App. Div. 636, 193 N. Y. Supp. 428(1st Dept. 1922); Stacy v. Shapiro, 212 App. Div. 723, 209 N. Y. Supp. 305(1st Dept. 1925) ("Toward a licensee is owed no affirmative duty, but only the
duty to refrain from doing anything to hurt him") ; EDGAR AND EDGAR, LAW OF
TORTS (3d ed. 1936) § 148.
12 Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept.
1922) ; Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fabian, 170 Misc. 665, 9 N. Y. Supp. (2d)
1018 (1938) ; Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass. 341, 187 N. E. 620 (1933) ; Baione v.
Heavey, 103 Pa. 529, 158 Ail. 181 (1932); cf. Suits v. Electric Park Amuse-
ment Co., 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S. W. 656 (1923); Ex parte Mobile Light &
R. R., 211 Ala. 525, 101 So. 177 (1924) ; Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n,
95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923).
13 In Osborne v. Cline, 263 N. Y. 434, 437, 189 N. E. 483, 484 (1934), the
court stated, "Common knowledge informs us that there are many spots in every
194o0)
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lot attendant collects the fee, and directs the owner where to park,
the owner locking the car or not as he sees fit; second, and by far
the most common method employed at the present time,14 those in
which the lot attendant collects the fee, directs the owner of the car
where to park, requests him to leave the keys in the car so that it can
be moved if the need to do so arises, and/or gives the owner a check
the presentation of which is required before the owner is permitted
to retake the car.
Under the first described method of doing business, the courts
have held that at best the lot owner is merely a licensor in that the
mere presence of the car in the lot, without some other indication of
a change in possession, is not sufficient to impose upon the lot owner
the duties of a bailee.Y5 In Suits v. Electric Park Amusement Coin-
pany,16 the plaintiff visited an amusement park owned by the defendant
and paid the admission fee. The plaintiff then parked his car in an
enclosed area to which he was directed by the attendant in charge.
The plaintiff locked his car and was not given a claim check. No
fee was charged by the defendant for parking in the area. In an ac-
tion brought by the plaintiff to recover for the theft of the car, the
court awarded judgment to the defendant amusement company on the
ground that the evidence did not disclose a sufficient delivery of the
car to the defendant to constitute him a bailee and, therefore, he was
under no obligation to eare for the vehicle.
The payment of a fee in the Suits case apparently would not have
had the effect of creating any responsibility on the part of the defen-
dant for, in Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Association,17 wherein the
factual situation was substantially the same as that presented in the
Suits case, the court stated, "The most that is shown by the evidence
is that the plaintiff paid * * * for the privilege of taking the car within
the defendant's enclosure and this was done for his own convenience
without any thought on the part of the parties that such car was either
actually or constructively in the possession of the defendant." 18
In New York there has as yet been no direct adjudication 1 9 of
city and village where open spaces are used for parking at a very small fee,
* * *. Circumstances vary and instances are graded all the way up to the housed
garage where cars can be left at more expense."
14 See Jones, Parking Lot Cases, op. cit. supra note 3; Note (1934) 14 B.
U. L. Rev. 368; (1924) 18 MiNe. L. REv. 352.
15 In Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n, 95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713, 714
(1923), it appeared that the plaintiff paid a fee to park in the defendant's fair
grounds. He was not given a check, nor did he leave the keys in the car at the
request or with the knowledge of the defendant. In an action to recover for
the theft of the car the defendant lot owner was awarded judgment on the
ground that "The plaintiff had the custody of the car when he entered the
grounds of the defendant, and retained control of it when he parked. * * * The
defendant never at any time had custody or control of the automobile and never
any control whatever over it." See Note (1925) 34 A. L. R. 925.
16213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S. W. 656 (1923).
17 95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923).
28 Id. at 714.
19 In Lader v. Warsher, 165 Misc. 559, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 160 (1937), the
[ VOL. 14
NOTES AND COMMENT
the relationship created between the owner of the car and the owner
of a parking lot conducting business in the manner described in the
first classification. However, dictum in Osborne v. Cline 20 to the
effect that the mere physical presence of a car in a parking lot is not
of itself a sufficient delivery to the parking lot owner to constitute a
bailment is a strong indication that the New York courts will follow
the rule laid down in Suits v. Electric Park Amusement Company 21
and Lord v. Oklk,,ontz State Fair Association.22 It is submitted, how-
ever, that in instances in which it appears that an owner of a business
operates an enclosed 23 parking lot supervised by an attendant, in con-
nection with the business, for the convenience of his customers, liabil-
ity could be predicated upon him on the theory of an implied contract
to care for the vehicle.24 It seems, however, that in the absence of
evidence of a technical delivery of the car to the possession of the lot
owner, the law will not impose upon him any obligation to protect the
vehicle.
There is authority, however, for the proposition that a parking
lot owner may by express agreement with the owner of the car, assume
the obligation to care for the vehicle despite the fact that there has
not been a change of possession sufficient to support a bailment con-
tract. Thus, in Pennroyal Fair Association v. Hite 2 5 it appeared that
the plaintiff drove his car into a fair ground operated by the defen-
defendant maintained a parking lot in connection with his hotel business, for
the convenience of his guests. The plaintiff, a guest at the defendant's hotel,
parked his car in the lot and locked it. Some articles were stolen from the car.
In an action to recover for the loss, judgment was awarded to the defendant.
The court did not state the nature of the relationship between the defendant lot
owner and the car owner, but held irrespective of the nature of the relationship,
the plaintiff could not recover in that he had not proved negligence on the part
of the defendant.
20 In Osborne v. Cline, 263 N. Y. 434, 437, 189 N. E. 483, 484 (1934), it
appeared that the plaintiff's wife drove into the defendant's parking lot, paid
the required fee and received no claim check. She left the keys in the car and
the car was stolen. At the trial there was conflicting testimony as to whether
or not the plaintiff's wife had been directed to lock the car. The lower court
found that as a matter of law a bailment relationship had been created. On
appeal, however, the decision was reversed on the ground that "the jury should
have passed upon this [bailment] question in this case and that the judge could
not decide it for himself as a matter of law".
21213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S. W. 656 (1923).
22 95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac. 713 (1923).
23 In instances in which it appears that the parking lot is enclosed, the
courts have generally stressed that point as an additional factor indicative of
the lot owner's possession of the car. See Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div.
6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 2d Dept. 1922); Crawford v. Hall, 56 Ga. App. 122,
192 S. E. 231 (1937).
24 See Bunnell v. Stem, 122 N. Y. 539, 25 N. E. 910 (1890) ; Galowitz v.
Maguer, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept. 1922); Lader v.
Warsher, 165 Misc. 559, 1 N. Y. S. (2d) 796 (1939); cf. Suits v. Electric
Park Ass'n, 213 Mo. App. 275, 249 S. W. 656 (1923).
25 195 Ky. 732, 243 S. W. 1046 (1922); see Chattanooga Interstate Fair
Ass'n v. Benton, .5 Tenn. App. 480 (1927) ; Jones, Parking Lot Cases (1938) 27
GEo. L. J. 162, 164.
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dant amusement company and paid the attendant a parking fee. The
car owner was not given a parking check and was requested to lock
his car. The car was stolen and the defendant fair association was
held liable for the loss, since the plaintiff proved that he had entered
into an express agreement with the attendant 2 6 under which the at-
tendant insured the safety of the car. Instances in which liability has
been predicated upon parking lot owners on the theory of special con-
tract, however, are few,2 7 and inasmuch as liability in these instances
arises through express agreement, they are of no aid in the determina-
tion of the nature of the jural relationship existing between the park-
ing lot owner and the owner of an automobile parked therein.
II.
Lot owners conducting business in the manner described under
the second classification have, without exception, been held to be
bailees 28 and, therefore, under a duty to protect vehicles parked
within the parking lot. Before considering cases in which liability
has been predicated upon the lot owner on the theory of bailment,
however, consideration will be given to the essentials necessary to the
creation of a bailment contract.
A bailment may be defined as a delivery of personalty for some
particular purpose upon a contract, expressed or implied, that after
the purpose has been fulfilled, the property shall be redelivered to the
person who delivered it.29  It has been consistently held that the pay-
ment of a fee is not essential to the creation of a bailment contract.30
However, inasmuch as the payment of a fee does increase the duty of
a bailee in respect to the degree of care he must exercise, 81 it is,
26 In Pennroyal Fair Ass'n v. Hite, 195 Ky. 732, 243 S. W. 1046, 1048
(1922), the defendant lot owner proved at the trial that the lot attendant had
no actual authority to agree to care for the plaintiff's car. The court found,
however, that the attendant had apparent authority to enter into the agreement,
stating that, " * * * it requires no argument to show that it was within the
apparent scope of the gatekeeper's employment, whose duty it was to, and who
did, collect the entrance fee as well as the charges for taking the property into
the ground, to make the special contract relied upon."
27 See notes 25, 26, supra.
28 Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept.
1924) ; Beetson v. Hollywood Athletic Club, 109 Cal. App. 715, 293 Pac. 821
(1930); Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass. 341, 187 N. E. 620 (1933) ; see Jones,
Parking Lot Cases (1938) 27 GEo. L. J. 162; Note (1934) 14 B. U. L. Rv.
368; (1939) 37 MICH. L. REv. 468.
29 Hogan v. O'Brien, 123 Misc. 865, 206 N. Y. Supp. 831 (1924) ; Scaou-
LER, BAILMENTS AND CARRIERS (2d ed. 1887) § 2, p. 2; 4 WiIsTroN, CoN-
TRACTS (Rev. ed. 1936) § 1032, p. 2888.
30 Seigel v. Spear & Co., 234 N. Y. 479, 138 N. E. 414 (1925) ; Hellawell
v. Hempstead Co-op. Building & Loan Ass'n, 249 App. Div. 622, 290 N. Y.
Supp. 954 (2d Dept. 1936) ; see 2 WILIsToN, CONTRACTS § 1038, pp. 1950, 1952.
31 In Fire Ass'n of Philadelphia v. Fabian, 170 Misc. 665, 667, 9 N. Y. S.
(2d) 1018, 1021 (1938), the court stated, "The degree of care a bailee is bound
to exercise depends upon whether the bailment is gratuitous, that is, for the
bailor's benefit without expense to him, or is a bailment for hire for the mutual
NOTES AND COMMENT
therefore, a matter to be considered in order to determine whether in
any given case the lot owner has used the degree of care required of
him.
32
It is apparent from the above definition and cases dealing with
the point,33 that the prime essentials to the creation of the usual 
3 4
bailment relation is the delivery of the property to the possession and
control of the bailee and his consent to such delivery. That the re-
quired change of possession of the car to the parking lot owner is
adequately effected under the second method of doing business, i.e.,
by leaving the keys in the car at the request of the attendant 3 5 plus
the issuance of a claim check,38 is apparently so obvious that the courts
invariably assume the existence of a bailment relationship without
discussion. Thus, in Baione v. Heavey 3 7 wherein it appeared that
the plaintiff car owner in accordance with the defendant lot owner's
way of doing business, paid the attendant the required parking fee,
left the keys in the car and received a claim check, the court held the
defendant parking lot owner liable for the theft of the plaintiff's car
on the theory of bailment. That the court in this case was justified
in finding a bailment relationship cannot be doubted, especially in view
of the fact that the courts have little difficulty in finding a bailment
relationship in instances wherein it appears that, although the car
owner was not required to leave the keys in the car, he was given a
check the presentation of which was required before the owner could
retake the car.
Thus, in Galowitz v. Magner,3 8 although the only evidence of a
benefit of bailor and bailee. In the former case the degree of care is 'slight';
in the latter case 'reasonable'. The bailee is liable in the former case for
'gross' negligence; in the latter for 'ordinary'. Whether these distinctions are
enlightening, the courts still recognize them."
32 In cases in which the courts determine that the relationship is one in the
nature of licensor-licensee, the fact of whether or not a fee has been charged
is immaterial. See Lord v. Oklahoma State Fair Ass'n, 95 Okla. 294, 219 Pac.
713 (1923).
33 Cowen v. Presspritch, 202 App. Div. 796, 194 N. Y. Supp. 926 (1st Dept.
1922); Van Wagoner v. Buckley, 148 App. Div. 808, 133 N. Y. Supp. 599 (2d
Dept. 1912); Krumsky v. Loeser, 37 Misc. 504, 75 N. Y. Supp. 1012 (1902);
Pattison v. Hammerstein, 17 Misc. 375, 39 N. Y. Supp. 1039 (1896) ("There
must, however, be an acceptance by the bailee of the goods forming the subject
matter of the bailment, before there can be any bailment. The law does not
insistently thrust the liabilities of a bailee upon one without his knowledge or
consent. Such acceptance may be express or implied, but until there is some-
thing to show notice or knowledge, until the facts, at least, are known by the
person, the law will not constitute him a bailee"); DOBIE, BAILMENTS AND
CARRIERS (1914) § 11, p. 24.
34 In some types of bailment, known as constructive bailments, neither an
actual nor constructive delivery is required. However, constructive bailments
have no application in parking lot cases. See 4 WILLISTON, CONTRAcTS (Rev.
ed. 1936) § 1038A, p. 2900; 6 AM. JUR. (1937) § 66, p. 193.
35 See notes 3, 5, 6, supra.
36 See notes 3, 5, 6, supra.
37 103 Pa. 529, 158 Atl. 181 (1932).
38 208 App. Div. 6, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421 (2d Dept. 1922).
1940 ]
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delivery of the plaintiff's car to the possession of the lot owner was
the fact that the defendant lot owner had given the plaintiff a claim
check, the court held the lot owner to be a bailee on the theory that
the transaction was "of the same nature as checking a parcel." 39 In
the Galowitz case the necessary change in possession was clearly
effected by the issuance of the claim check, for it provided a means
whereby the lot owner could retain control of the vehicle even as
against the plaintiff owner, until the check was presented.40 The
court found that the necessary consent on the part of the lot owner
to such change in possession could be inferred by the fact that the
defendant testified that he "maintained * * * [a] fenced parking
space 41 and three attendants 'looking after, taking care of the cars as
they came in and went out.' "42
The only remaining situation in which the question of the lot
owner's liability for loss or damage to a patron's car is likely to arise
is in instances in which the parking lot owner directs the owner of
the car to leave the keys in the ignition, but does not give him a claim
check. Under circumstances such as this the courts consistently and
justifiably hold that a bailment relation is created between the owner
of the parking lot and the owner of the car.4 3  Clearly, under these
circumstances the two essential requirements of a bailment contract,
namely, the delivery of possession of the vehicle to the lot owner, and
his consent to such delivery, have been met, the former by the leaving
of the keys in the car,44 and the latter by his request to do so. Indeed,
the parking lot owner's consent to the delivery of the possession of
a patron's car has been inferred, on his part, from his unprotested
knowledge that the owner of the car left the keys in the ignition even
though not requested to do so.4 5
Just how far the courts will go in finding the necessary elements
of a bailment contract in parking lot cases, is clearly evidenced by the
decision of the court in Fire Association of Philadelphia v. Fabian.4 6
39 Id. at 8, 203 N. Y. Supp. at 423.
40 The claim check in the Galowitz case contained a disclaimer of the defen-
dant's liability, in fine print. The plaintiff paid no attention except to take the
check and put it in his pocket. The court in holding that the disclaimer was
ineffective stated, "* * * the disclaimer of liability could only become effective
if brought to the plaintiff's knowledge. * * * Its presence on the ticket or stub
is quite as consistent with a contract of bailment as with one for a mere rental
of parking space." See Wendt v. Sley System Garage, 124 Pa. 224, 188 Ad.
624 (1936).
41 See note 23, supra.
42 Galowitz v. Magner, 208 App. Div. 6, 8, 203 N. Y. Supp. 421, 423 (2d
Dept. 1922).
43 The delivery of a key has always been associated with a transfer of
possession. BENjAImN, SALES (7th ed. 1899) § 696, p. 715 ("where goods are
ponderous and incapable of being handed over from one to another, there need
not be an actual delivery, but it may be done by that which is tantamount, such
as the delivery of the key **
44 See note 43, supra.
45 Doherty v. Ernst, 284 Mass. 341, 187 N. E. 620 (1933).
46 170 Misc. 665, 9 N. Y. S. (2d) 1018 (1938).
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In the Fire Association of Philadelphia case it appeared that it was
the custom of the patrons of the defendant's parking lot to park their
cars wherever space permitted without advising the defendant there-
of, and to get them without notifying him except when necessary to
move a car before they could make their exit. It was also the custom
of the patrons to leave their keys either in the cars or upon a key-
board in an office adjacent to the parking yard. The plaintiff car
owner who was familiar with this custom, except that he denied
knowledge of the keyboard, parked his car in the defendant's lot and
left the keys in it. The car was stolen. The defendant lot owner was
found to be a bailee.47 The court found that inasmuch as the keys
were left in the car, the defendant lot owner had a right to exercise
physical control over the car at his discretion, and, therefore, the re-
quirement of a change of possession had been met. The court, how-
ever, did not consider the lot owner's consent 'to said change in
possession. Seemingly, however, the defendant lot owner's consent
could be inferred from the fact that he knew of the custom of his
patrons to leave their keys in the cars, and made no objection.
A review of the cases in the various jurisdictions discloses that
though the courts are ready to find the necessary delivery of a patron's
car to the lot owner with the latter's consent, still the mere presence
of the car in the parking lot is not, in itself, a sufficient delivery to
constitute the lot owner a bailee. Since, however, the cases indicate
that in the majority of instances the parking lot owner either requests
the patron to leave the keys in the car or gives the patron a claim
check, statements to the effect that the parking lot owner is a bailee,48
though not technically correct, are practically speaking, a fair state-
ment of his status.
WILLIAm F. PODESTA.
HIGHWAYS AND TOLL RoADs.
A short time ago the New York Court of Appeals, by a three-
to-four decision, declared illegal a toll placed by the County of West-
chester on the Hutchinson River Parkway.' The parkway, the court
held, is part of our highway system, and a toll on a public highway is
violative of Section 54 of the New York Vehicle and Traffic Law.2
-1 The court in the Fire Association case refused to hold the defendant
liable, however, on the ground that the plaintiff owner was contributorily negli-
gent in leaving the keys in the car.
48 See note 7, supra.
I People v. Westchester, 282 N. Y. 224, - N. E. (2d) - (1940).
2 N. Y. VEHICLE AND TRAFFIc LAW § 54 provides: "Except as otherwise
provided in this chapter, local authorities shall have no power to pass, enforce
and maintain any ordinance, rule or regulation requiring from any owner of a
1940 ]
